ARTICLE RESPONSE ABOUT EXTERNAL FACTORS IMPACTING ANALYSIS
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Articles Response about External Factors Impacting Analysis
Article One
I am in agreement with the article’s analysis of Kam’s discussion on organization pressures that compromised the Pearl Harbor. Some of these pressures include Cry Wolf, Wait-and-See, Worst-Case, Security of Sources, Current Events, and Restriction of Information. In particular, the article reveals how the “Cry Wolf” phenomenon was used as a common strategy in the events that led up to the Pearl Harbor. Indeed, constant false alarms left the intelligence receivers vulnerable to any attacks. At first, the intelligence officers dealt with the alarms professionally. However, they soon let their guard down when they responded to hoax alarms continuously.
Additionally, the article makes a correct assessment when it states that the Wait and See Attitude was applied at the Pearl Harbor incident. The article applies relevant examples to support its findings. Admiral Kimmel’s scenario is a spot on example to describe the Wait and See Attitude. Similar to the False Alarms, this strategy also left its users vulnerable to attacks. The user’s tendency to await verification regarding a certain issue, with the knowledge that time is running out, led them to drop their guard. At this point, the article points out that these maneuvers could be overcome.
The writer of the article does a commendable job in describing some of the analytical methods of overcoming the “Cry Wolf” phenomenon. The solution offered for this weakness is detailed. Additionally, it includes relevant examples that support it. However, the article does not offer any solution on how to overcome the Wait and See attitude. Other than this, the writer achieves his or her objective.
Article Two
On the other hand, the second article regarding the same issue is more detailed and comprehensive. The article has well-organized ideas and starts with a crisp introduction. However, the reader is left puzzled at the first mention of the ambassador to Tokyo. The article does not introduce him or her properly thus leaving the reader on the edge. Through this article, the reader understands the series of events that happened prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. However, at this point, the article loses focus and concentrates on these events rather than the pressures affecting intelligence analysis and their relation to the Pearl Harbor attack.
Furthermore, I am not in agreement with the writer’s idea on the Cry Wolf strategy. Primarily, this strategy involved making a series of false alarms to the intended target that eventually left them confused. With every false alarm, the target reacts less seriously, as such; they are left vulnerable in the end. However, the article holds a differing view about the Cry Wolf strategy. I concur with the writer that the Cry Wolf led its victim into employing the Wait and See strategy. When the target is uncertain about whether the next attack will be real or false, it often turns to a state of wait and see before determining the next course of action.
Similarly, the article goes on to point out the various remedies to these strategies. ACH is one of the remedies discussed, and its analysis is correct. In such situations, ACH would have been an appropriate means of assessing situations in an event and determine the most appropriate course of action.