Name:
Instructor:
Course:
Date:
Reviews of Cooperative Game Theory Articles
Review of: India has started taking theoretical techniques like game theory seriously while framing policies. By Mishita Mehra.
Abstract
In a significant 2011 article, Mishita Mehra analyzed the political situation in India with a particular focus on the introduction of game theory in policy formulation as well as in analysis of practical issues. This review explains the major themes, her methodology, and the ending.
As the individuals behind the proper utilization of the game theory in countless situations globally, Bruce Beuno de Mesquita and Milind Tambe were charged with restoring sanity and efficiency within the Indian administrative system at a time when it was much needed. Game theories have been widely used in different situations from sports to warfare (Mehraa 9). Currently, India is the latest entrant into the publicity surrounding the usage of game theory to frame its policies. Some of the earliest beneficiaries of this endeavor include the development of 3G auctions program (Mehra 12). The paper concentrates on the usage of game theory to address complications and challenges in the national security sector. Mishita argued that the purpose was to organize limited available resources, which in this case was security staff in a way that lowered the likelihood of an unfavorable occurrence such as a terrorist assault. The author cited the works by Milind Tambe that addressed the introduction of unsystematic checkpoints within the main cities to remove the element of predictability and consequently, inability to thwart events of crime and corruption (Mehra 26). Tambe has personally conducted research into the security sector within Mumbai.
The author pointed out Tambe’s legitimacy and validity as a researcher on the subject of cooperative game theory by outlining his contributions. Tambe was responsible for conceiving a game theory model that was applied in several United States airports successfully. Tambe noted that most policy makers needed to be ahead of their rivals and adversaries and this could be made possible using an unpredictable security strategy that had the conventional features of capturing all the significant targets. She concluded Tambe’s feature by mentioning his approach that involved using mathematical solutions to solve policy problems (Mehra 33).
I think that this paper is noteworthy since conventional approaches have failed to solve the global and national problems that plague companies, individuals, and governments. Particularly, conventional methods have failed to come up with efficient and viable defense and security policies. Conversely, game theory offers an accurate and working solution using scientific methods to analyze the variables. Adopting the recommendations and findings published by Mesquita, Tambe and other game theorists can contribute significantly towards leaner and more efficient government policies.
Review of: Cooperative Game Theory by Holger I. Meinhardt
Abstract
The introduction and subsequent chapters offer the reader with several game properties and solution proposals from cooperative game theories that possess transferable utility.
The article confined itself to arguing on cooperative game theory to the section where the cooperative productivity of a coalition is calculated by a numeraire commodity such as currency and consequently, can be reassigned among the actors using side-payments (Kumabe & Mihara 41). The intention of the initial chapters was not to provide a wide-ranging review of cooperative game theory. Instead, it simply discussed these parts all the parts that were significant to comprehending the remaining sections of the monograph where it relied heavily on cooperative game theory to examine the motivational factors for cooperative decision making in universal pool conditions (Meinhardt 7). In the examination of a common pool environment, the article was interested in the viable profits that were achievable through cooperation in addition to the subject of whether individuals benefited more through cooperation or whether they were better off alone (Meinhardt 12).
The basic concept behind a cooperative game is that different coalitions enforce cooperative habits and compete with other coalitions. The article discussed the prevalent mathematical aspects of most cooperative game theories including duality and sub games. Meinhardt used a direct methodology that incorporated data collection from a pool of participants. The participants were allowed to team up in coalitions and given tasks within their groups after which the activity in each team was recorded (Meinhardt 19). Some of the data collected included levels of productivity, team cohesion, and cooperation among members.
I think that this paper is significant as it provides a theoretical clarification of experimental cooperative conduct in general pool circumstances. The motivational factors for making decisions in a cooperative setting are examined using a cooperative game theoretical structure. In the initial steps, core existence results are calculated. While universal core existence outcomes furnish the researcher with a solution for shared cooperation, little can be stated on how dominant these motivational factors and how unwavering these cooperative contracts are. To elucidate these queries, the convexity feature for common pool games in inspected in a second stage. In conclusion, Meinhardt covered the essential elements of cooperative game theory in a clear way. His arguments and illustrations also touched on other related theories such as consensus decision making as well as coordination game theory (Meinhardt 28). By covering the related academic literature, the paper improved its validity.
Work Cited
Top of Form
Top of Form
Kumabe, M. & Mihara, H. R. “Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities”. Journal of Mathematical Economics 47 (2): 150–158. (2011).Print. Bottom of Form
Mehra, M. “India has started taking theoretical techniques like game theory seriously while framing policies”. The Economic Times. (2011). (2002). Print.
Meinhardt, H. I. “Cooperative Decision Making in Common Pool Situations”. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 517.) Print.