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Trade in Human Body Organs Unethical
Organ donation is inherently a controversial topic devoid of putting financial compensation into account. It is based on the informed consent of the donor, a subject that is already being challenged. Every driver, upon getting their license, is recruited into the pool that entails their organs will be harvested to save another life in the event of the end of their own in a road carnage situation. There are more than 3,000 individuals on the waiting list for the organ transplantation system. Nonetheless, the burgeoning waiting list does not warrant the use of incentives primarily monetary to expedite the process. The money used to facilitate the creation of an organ market would be better invested into research to elongate the lives of the pending recipients despite their failed organs. In the event of the success of organ market, however dismal, there will be a concomitant shut down in the moral compass of the entire society. By bringing money into the equation, it undermines the true meaning on the word donor. Organ trade is unethical as it makes individuals commodities leading to the poor to undermine their dignity and right for temporary gains.
The current organ black market shows the beneficiary of organ trade is invariably the wealthy. The trade implies that one life supersedes another. All the stakeholders are usually driven by self-interest informed or otherwise (Columb 33). Therefore, one individual compromises his/her physical well-being to increase the longevity of another. It is critical to note that health practitioners are often the mediators of these illegal transactions as the transplants are done in medical facilities. Extra participants are the brokers who fix clients with the donors. The prevalent research of the organ black market should be a deterrent to legalizing the craft. The poor villagers in Central Asia are recorded to be highest donors of kidneys for money (Trey, Torsten, Caplan, and Lavee 72). They are often left with an indelible scar from the surgery and a corresponding deterioration in health if not done under the proper conditions. Subsequently, the coerced donors are given less than the agreed amount that incentivized their donation. Often the advertisements may include a visa to the US, which is an erudite potential donor will innately discern to be false. It follows that the assertion that the trade preys on the ignorant is true.
Leading scientists, among other proponents of the legalization of organ trade posit that a controlled environment for the trade will resolve the urgent organ deficit. They posit that despite the claims of exploitation of the poor, they have a degree of control of their decisions with the exceptions of the mentally challenged. The regulation of the organ transplant market is viable, as it will create an environment where proper screening can be done helping medical practitioners honor the duty of life preservation (Koplin 12). They further argue that the market mechanisms will eventually bring prices down thus only altruistic people will be attracted into the market. They claim when the procedures are done in public, the success of the transplants increases simultaneously protecting the life of both stakeholders. The scientists claim that with the advancements in medical technology, procedures such as kidney transplants are virtually harmless.
The proponents’ suppositions amount to well-phrased lies. The claim that the kidney procedures have minimal casualties is false, as evidenced by the low number of donors who are physicians. The health status of a donor can change any time (Yousaf, Navid, and Purkayastha 197). If he develops diabetes after the fact, the repercussions are dire. The well informed even the said scientists are rarely the donors of the organs devoid of the event of dying relative. The assertion that the donors consent is free of coercion is weak as when there are commercial gains at stake even murder is possible. For example, In China, prisoners were executed and their organs sold to the highest bidder. In the countries that have legalized the organ trade, the beneficiaries are mostly foreigners with a higher economic status hence the term, organ tourism (Cohen 273). The belief that the government can regulate the black market lacks foresight and naive at most. Rather than attract law-abiding donors, it will embolden the preexisting organ smuggling underworld. The majority of organ donors are usually poor and illiterate. It follows that they are ignorant of the functions of the body parts be it a liver or a kidney. The organ transplant system is already under the microscope for impartiality any hint of financial gain by the government will condemn the system to death.
The
sanctity of life needs to be protected
regardless one’s economic status. People living under impoverished conditions
are ripe for exploitation. It follows that dangling the prospect of monetary
gains is often sufficient to make them donate
their organs often at the expense of their lives. The body organs are not
goods. Treating them as such undermines the basis of human dignity. Financial
compensation is not a feasible solution to the organ deficit dilemma, as it
will ultimately create an opportunity for desperate poor to be exploited by the
rich.
Works Cited
Cohen, I. Glenn. “Transplant tourism: the ethics and regulation of international markets for organs.” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 41.1 (2013): 269-285. Print.
Columb, Seán. “Beneath the organ trade: a critical analysis of the organ trafficking discourse.” Crime, law, and social change 63.1-2 (2015): 21-47. Print.
Koplin, Julian. “Assessing the likely harms to kidney vendors in regulated organ markets.” The American Journal of Bioethics 14.10 (2014): 7-18. Print.
Trey, Torsten, Arthur L. Caplan, and Jacob Lavee. “Transplant ethics under scrutiny–responsibilities of all medical professionals.” Croatian medical journal 54.1 (2013): 71-74. Print.
Yousaf, Farhan Navid, and Bandana Purkayastha. “Social world of organ transplantation, trafficking, and policies.” Journal of public health policy 37.2 (2016): 190-199. Print.